Introduction
The task of these pages is to offer a survey of how a few recent books in the scientific study of religion have been recieved by reviewers. With the exception of Wilson, all of these authors work in the new cognitivist approach, which, for all the high claims made for it, has been met thus far with considerable resistance, both among professional scholars of religion and among the general public. The assumption on entering this project is that such approaches can only be fruitful in advancing the conversation on religion, and very well might represent a considerable paradigm shift. Whether this turns out to be the case or not, it is clear enough already that the discussion about these approaches could be carried on much more productively than it has been so far. In this respect, Explanation in Review is an effort at sociology of knowledge with prescriptive goals.
Explanatory work on religion using modern scientific methods still has yet to gain a strong foothold in much mainstream religious studies research. This is for good reasons; the influential Chicago school of the mid-20th century, with its emphasis on anti-reductionism and humanistic rather than experimental training, gave the field's leading scholars little foundation for pursuing serious scientific work. In many departments, despite decades of important publications suggesting otherwise, "reductionism" is still a valid accusation to make against someone trying to understand religious phenomena on anything other than its own terms. Meanwhile, practitioners of new scientific methods have sometimes gone far to utterly dismiss decades of important humanistic work on religions, and their grasp of the material they intend to explain suffers as a result. Clearly both camps can benefit from a more balanced discussion, which on the whole has yet to happen.
In the popular press, these explanatory methods have been used primarily in polemic attacks on religion, such as in the work of Daniel Dennett and Richard Dawkins. Though the books of these "New Atheists" have sold very well, they evoke almost unanimous ire among reviewers and outright dismissal among serious intellectuals. Meanwhile one of the founders of the cognitivist approach to religion, Justin Barrett, is himself a confessed evangelical Christian, and seems to find no contradiction between an evolved prediliction for religiosity in the human mind and religious faith. In his book reviewed here, he actually turns his conclusions against atheism, which satisfied a pair of Mormon reviewers. If Barrett is right, and cognitivist work can be equally an argument for faith as for not, there is no reason why it should be written off in the public discussion along with religion's "cultured despisers." Even if it did refute the truth of faith intrinsically, the scientific findings themselves need not always be presented a concert with such polemical intentions.
As religious studies scholars seek to locate and justify themselves on the shifting terrains of the academy, they cannot afford to be absent from discussions about religion in scientific contexts. Interdisciplinarity is not a mere catchword, but the clear trend of research across the university. As traditional phenomenological and comparative methodologies have lost their appeal in religion departments, interdisciplinarity is all that holds the field together in the first place. The lack of descriptive and theoretical sophistication in scientific work and the lack of scientific sophistication in humanistic work points to a clear need for collaboration between and among scholars. Entering the scientific conversation does not mean that established humanistic scholars need to get an additional Ph.D., only that they engage in conversations with trained scientists, geared at mutual exchange.
Too often scholars in the humanistic vein have demanded of the scientific approaches, "Show me how this will help me with my data!" But this is anathema to dialog. How can the scientists know how to fit their work into the particular questions and problems of the humanists? It is a challenge for the humanists themselves, not the scientists. Conversation instead should begin with the recognition of a common subject of study--namely religion--and proceed through the mutual sharing of research questions, of expertise, and of methodologies. Scientific theories do not exist for the sole use of humanistic research, nor vis versa. The work of each needs to happen in dialog with the other. To ignore such a dialog, when the possibility exists, is irresponsible scholarship.
The exuberance of some cognitivists' claims--to have initiated a major paradigm shift to the exclusion of all previous scholarship on religion--needs to end. It served a purpose in helping them create an insulated discussion that got them to their feet, but such talk goes no further. So also must we leave behind our accusations of "reductionism," which all should be able to recognize as a justified, productive, and unavoidable intellectual activity. Good theorists and researchers in the humanistic religious studies line need to open doors--both theoretical and physical--to scientists, and scientists need to open theirs. The heated public discussions on religion in recent years only underscore the need for delicate care in this work. "Religion" as such is not so much a natural phenomenon as an ideological construct, built out of natural, cultural, and political forces. It is not a law of nature or a simple decree but a contested human creation and possession, one that strangely both can and cannot be easily controlled by wishes, prayers, and laboratories.